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Abstract
In social groups where relatedness among interacting individuals is low, cooperation can often only be maintained through
mechanisms that repress competition among group members. Repression-of-competition mechanisms, such as policing
and punishment, seem to be of particular importance in human societies, where cooperative interactions often occur
among unrelated individuals. In line with this view, economic games have shown that the ability to punish defectors
enforces cooperation among humans. Here, I examine a real-world example of a repression-of-competition system, the
police institutions common to modern human societies. Specifically, I test evolutionary policing theory by comparing data
on policing effort, per capita crime rate, and similarity (used as a proxy for genetic relatedness) among citizens across the 26
cantons of Switzerland. This comparison revealed full support for all three predictions of evolutionary policing theory. First,
when controlling for policing efforts, crime rate correlated negatively with the similarity among citizens. This is in line with
the prediction that high similarity results in higher levels of cooperative self-restraint (i.e. lower crime rates) because it aligns
the interests of individuals. Second, policing effort correlated negatively with the similarity among citizens, supporting the
prediction that more policing is required to enforce cooperation in low-similarity societies, where individuals’ interests
diverge most. Third, increased policing efforts were associated with reductions in crime rates, indicating that policing
indeed enforces cooperation. These analyses strongly indicate that humans respond to cues of their social environment and
adjust cheating and policing behaviour as predicted by evolutionary policing theory.
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Introduction
Ever since Darwin [1], cooperative behaviours have puzzled
evolutionary biologists, as it is difficult to understand why natural
selection should favour traits that benefit other individuals.
Inclusive fitness theory [2] provides a solution to that problem
by showing that a cooperative trait can be selected for when the
fitness cost (c) to the actor is smaller than the fitness benefit (b)t o
the recipient times the relatedness (r) between the two: rb.c
(Hamilton’s rule). Accordingly, Hamilton’s rule can be satisfied
when cooperation provides direct fitness benefits (i.e. mutual
beneficial cooperation with c,0), or when cooperation provides
indirect (kin-selected) fitness benefits (i.e. altruistic cooperation
with c.0) [3–5]. For both types of cooperative behaviours, low
relatedness introduces divergence in reproductive interests among
interacting individuals, thereby promoting selfish behaviours [6].
Consequently, under low-relatedness conditions cooperation can
often only be maintained through mechanisms that repress
competition among group members. Repression of competition
mechanisms, such as policing [7–10], punishment [11,12],
sanctions [13,14], and randomization of reproductive success
[15,16], enforce cooperation because they unite the proximate
interests of group members, such that individuals can only increase
their inclusive fitness by maximizing the reproductive output of the
group [16–23]. For example, social insect workers in low-
relatedness societies often police their co-workers by destroying
their selfishly laid eggs, thereby potentially maximizing colony
productivity and guaranteeing a fair share of indirect fitness
benefits among colony members [24]. Similarly, studies have
shown that the possibility to punish non-cooperative individuals
enforces cooperation among unrelated humans in economic games
[25,26], thereby guaranteeing a fair share of direct benefits of
cooperation.
Despite the awareness that repression-of-competition mecha-
nisms seem to be of central importance in human societies
[17,18,25–27], real-world systems such as the sophisticated
policing institutions common to modern human societies have
virtually attracted no attention by evolutionary biologists. This
contrasts with the long-standing interest among economists to
understand economic aspects of policing [28–32]. Consequently,
general information on the behavioural ecology of human policing
is lacking and it is unknown whether humans respond to changes
in policing efforts and community demography as predicted by
evolutionary policing theory [20,21,33].
Here, I conduct a test of evolutionary policing theory by
comparing policing data across the 26 cantons of Switzerland. The
cantons of Switzerland provide a unique and highly suitable
system for such a test because each canton represents a politically
independent republic that features an independent policing
system, which at the same time must adhere to the federal code
of law. Because data collection on policing and many other
demographic variables is coordinated at the federal level and is
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among cantons.
For each canton, I extracted relevant data from the Swiss
Statistical Encyclopedia (SSE) – an open-access database – to test
the three main predictions of evolutionary policing theory [20].
The first prediction holds that in the absence of policing, increased
relatedness among members of a social group leads to higher levels
of cooperative self-restraint (i.e. lower levels of defection). In other
words, high relatedness aligns the interests of individuals, which is
predicted to result in higher levels of cooperation. The second
prediction holds that the policing effort is a negative function of
relatedness. Put simply, more policing is required to enforce
cooperation under low-relatedness conditions, where interests
among individuals diverge most. The third prediction holds that
higher policing efforts enforce cooperation more efficiently thereby
resulting in higher levels of cooperation. Three variables are
needed to test these predictions, which are: (i) the level of
cooperation/defection; (ii) policing effort; and (iii) relatedness
among interacting individuals. In economic games, the level of
cooperation or defection is usually given by a subject’s respective
decision to contribute or not to contribute monetary units to a
public good [34]. Such individual-based levels of cooperation and
defection cannot be obtained from comparative data sets as used
here. However, in the current context cooperation can be
regarded as an act of self-restraint, whereby cooperative
individuals are the ones that obey the law, whereas defecting
individuals are the ones that violate the law. Consequently, the per
capita crime rate can be regarded as a proxy for the level of
defection, and an inverse proxy for the level of cooperative self-
restraint at the community level (see [9,32] for using similar
approaches). To estimate policing effort, I calculated the per capita
monetary investment into policing. To obtain a proxy for
relatedness among citizens, I defined a similarity index, which
combined data on community size (i.e. number of citizens) and
proportion of foreigners. The reasoning here is that humans,
although today mostly living in societies where relatedness is low,
have likely evolved the ability to respond to cues of relatedness in
the past, when cooperative interactions occurred in much smaller
societies and probably preferentially among related individuals
[35]. It is likely that people have retained the ability to respond to
these cues, irrespective of the current adaptive consequences. This
is reflected by laboratory studies, showing that humans respond to
cues of increased similarity by up-regulating cooperation [36–38].
Methods
Data collection
I obtained data on crime rates, monetary investment into
policing, the number of citizens, and proportion of foreigners from
SSE (http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/infothek/
lexikon.html) – an open-access database provided by the Swiss
government (Table 1). Consequently, this study is based on a
comparative approach, and does not involve human participants.
Therefore, no approval by the author’s institutional ethical review
board was needed for this study.
For the per capita crime rate, I considered crimes that violated
the main code of law (i.e. the ‘Schweizerische Strafgesetzbuch’,
StGB) and divided the number of registered crimes by the number
of citizens. The StGB covers all types of crimes, except crimes
related to drug abuse/dealing and violation of traffic rules (i.e.
82% of all crimes reported in Switzerland in 2009 fall under the
StGB). For the policing effort, I divided the amount of tax money
invested into policing by the number of citizens. To obtain a proxy
for relatedness, I calculated a similarity index (s) as follows. I first
defined dissimilarity (d) among citizens as d = wlog(c) + f, where
log(c) is the natural logarithm of the number of citizens, f is the
proportion of foreigners, and w is a scaling factor such that both
addends are weighted equally. I then calculated s =1-d/dmax,
where dmax represents the highest dissimilarity value observed
among all cantons. Consequently, s ranges between zero and one,
whereby s=0 for the canton with dmax.
I used data from 2009 for crime rates, the number of citizens,
and the proportion foreigners, whereas for the monetary
investment into policing, I used data from 2008, the most recent
data set available. This was not a problem as cantonal investment
into policing highly correlated between years (e.g. between 2007
and 2008: Pearson’s product moment correlation r.0.999). I
further repeated analyses with data sets from 2005 and 2007 to
examine the generality of my findings. For these earlier years, I
obtained data on number of citizens, proportion of foreigners and
monetary investment into policing from SSE. For crime rates, I
obtained data from the cantonal bureaus of statistics, because no
standardized federal data sets were available for these earlier years.
Statistical analysis
To test the first prediction of policing theory – increased
relatedness leads to lower crime rates (i.e. higher levels of
cooperation) in the absence of policing – I conducted a partial
correlation analysis, where I examined the relationship between
the similarity index and the per capita crime rate, whilst
controlling for policing effort. To test the second prediction of
policing theory – higher policing effort is required with lower
relatedness – I used Pearson’s product-moment correlation to
examine the relationship between per capita monetary investment
into policing and the similarity index. To test the third prediction
of policing theory – higher policing effort reduces crime rate (i.e.
increases the level of cooperation) – I first used Pearson’s product-
moment correlation to examine the relationship between per
capita monetary investment into policing and the per capita crime
rate. The test of this last prediction was the main focus of
numerous economical studies, which yielded controversial results
(reviewed in [30,32]). The reason for this controversy was that in a
specific year the policing effort is often the product of crime rates
and not vice versa, which prevents testing the third prediction of
evolutionary policing theory. To control for that problem, I
conducted an alternative test of this prediction by relating
between-year changes in policing efforts to between-year changes
in crime rates. Here, one would predict that crime rates should
decrease or increase in cantons that extend or reduce their policing
efforts, respectively. For this analysis, I compared data from 2005
and 2007 (note that data from 2009 could not be used for such a
comparison because a new standardized method for data
collection was used from this year onwards). As the testing of
these hypotheses involved multiple pairwise comparisons, I applied
the false discovery rate control method [39] to adjust the nominal
a=0.05. All statistical analyses were conducted with R 2.11.1
(http://www.R-project.org).
Results
I found strong support for the first and the second prediction of
policing theory in all three study years (Table 2). First, when
statistically controlling for policing efforts, per capita crime rates
were significantly lower in societies with higher similarity indexes
(Figure 1A). Second, policing efforts were significantly lower in
societies with higher similarity values (Figure 1B).
In contrast, when relating policing efforts to per capita crime
rates, there was first no support for the third prediction of policing
theory (Table 2), as policing efforts correlated positively, and not
Policing in Human Societies
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Canton
Number of citizens
in thousands*
Percentage of
foreigners*
Policing expenses
in million CHF
+
Number of
registered crimes*
Aargau 600.0 21.5 156.1 32735
Appenzell Innerrhoden 15.7 10.0 3.8 419
Appenzell Ausserrhoden 53.0 13.9 13.2 2367
Bern 974.2 13.0 368.7 67800
Basel-Landschaft 272.8 18.9 78.6 13962
Basel-Stadt 187.9 31.5 145.1 20467
Fribourg 273.2 17.7 83.9 14391
Gene `ve 453.3 38.7 360.1 63905
Glarus 38.5 19.8 20.7 1532
Graubu ¨nden 191.9 16.1 91.9 8156
Jura 70.1 12.3 22.0 2986
Luzern 373.0 16.4 112.7 23229
Neucha ˆtel 171.6 23.1 70.2 13429
Nidwalden 40.8 10.7 9.1 1287
Obwalden 35.0 12.9 8.1 1504
St. Gallen 474.7 21.7 128.4 24162
Schaffhausen 75.7 22.9 32.0 4296
Solothurn 252.7 19.3 89.3 16216
Schwyz 144.7 18.0 41.0 5370
Thurgau 244.8 21.0 55.7 11347
Ticino 335.7 25.4 129.1 20236
Uri 35.3 9.4 21.4 1069
Vaud 701.5 30.5 283.2 58467
Valais 307.4 20.4 102.9 15114
Zug 110.9 23.3 46.5 7264
Zu ¨rich 1351.3 23.7 851.0 117099
*data from 2009 / + data from 2008.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024350.t001
Table 2. Predictions of evolutionary policing theory [20] and the corresponding empirical tests using data from the 26 cantons of
Switzerland in 2005, 2007, and 2009.
Prediction Year
Level of
comparison
Correlation
coefficient P-value
Reference
to figure
Negative correlation between
crime rate and similarity index
2005 cantons 20.561 0.0066 -
2007 cantons 20.714 ,0.0001 -
2009 cantons 20.805 ,0.0001 Figure 1A
Negative correlation between
policing effort and similarity index
2005 cantons 20.594 0.0014 -
2007 cantons 20.527 0.0057 -
2009 cantons 20.541 0.0043 Figure 1B
Negative correlation between
policing effort and crime rate
2005 cantons 0.767 ,0.0001 -
2007 cantons 0.744 ,0.0001 -
2009 cantons 0.703 ,0.0001 Figure 1C
2005/2007 years 20.440 0.0405 Figure 1D
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024350.t002
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This finding indicates towards the problem of causality well known
from economic studies [30,32], which showed that at any given
moment in time the policing effort is dictated by the crime rate (i.e.
higher crime rates demand disproportionally large policing efforts).
Conversely, when I related yearly changes in policing efforts to
yearly changes in crime rates, I found that cantons that increased
policing efforts from 2005 to 2007 showed an average decrease
in crime rates (n=16; decrease in per capita crime rate =
20.003660.0018), whereas cantons that reduced policing efforts
between years showed an average increase in crime rates (n=6;
increase in per capita crime rate =0.001860.0023; one-tailed t-
test between the two categories: t20=21.87, P=0.038). Overall,
there was a significant negative correlation between the yearly
changes in policing efforts and crime rates (Table 2, Figure 1D), a
finding that is fully compatible with the third prediction of
evolutionary policing theory.
Discussion
By relating demographic data to crime rates and policing efforts
across the 26 cantons of Switzerland, I found full support of all
three predictions of evolutionary policing theory [20]. Specifically,
I show that: (i) when controlling for policing efforts, crime rates
decreased with higher similarities among citizens; (ii) higher
policing efforts were observed when similarity among citizens was
low; (iii) increased policing efforts went along with a reduction in
crime rates. These analyses strongly indicate that humans respond
to cues of their social environment and adjust cheating and
policing behaviour accordingly.
The first finding, showing that crime rates were lower in
societies with high similarity indexes, suggests that similarity
among citizens can be considered analogous to genetic relatedness
as used in Hamilton’s rule. Specifically, it seems that high
similarity, analogous to high genetic relatedness, aligns the interest
of individuals in a group and thereby promotes cooperative self-
restraint even in the absence of policing. There are at least two
explanations why this might be. First, similarity might have served
as a cue for genetic relatedness in the past when self-restraint
probably provided indirect benefits due to interactions mostly
taking place among related individuals [35]. Although in modern
human societies relatedness is actually often low, people might still
respond to these cues, irrespective of the adaptive consequences.
Second, similarity – although having potentially served as a cue for
relatedness in the past – might have turned into a new cue that
allows assessing how likely it is to engage in repeated interactions
with the same partner and/or how important reputation building
is. The idea here is that people in high-similarity societies (i.e.
Figure 1. Testing predictions of evolutionary policing theory with data from human societies. Significant correlations (indicated by trend
lines) between: (a) the per capita crime rate and the similarity index; (b) the policing effort (per capita investment into policing) and the similarity
index; (c) the policing effort and the per capita crime rate; (d) the between-year change in policing effort and crime rate. Each data point represents
one out of the 26 cantons of Switzerland.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024350.g001
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cooperative self-restraint because the importance of reciprocal
interactions and reputation building increases – two factors that
are well known to promote mutualistic cooperation among
humans [18,40–42].
The second finding, showing that policing efforts were highest in
societies with low similarity indexes, conforms with policing theory
because it shows that disproportionally large investments into
policing are required to enforce cooperation under conditions
where interests among individuals diverge most. These results are
in agreement with findings from an experimental study showing
that the level of punishment in economic games increases with size
of the community the participants originate from [43]. This
strongly suggests that humans respond to cues of similarity in their
community by adjusting the level of policing and punishment.
Moreover, the agreement between my findings and the experi-
mental results from Marlowe et al. [43] nicely illustrates that
humans transfer cues from their natural social environments to
experimental settings, where they do not necessarily have any
implications [44–47].
The third finding supports the key prediction of evolutionary
policing theory, namely that increased policing efforts reduce
crime rates, thereby enforcing cooperation. Investigating the
relationship between policing effort and crime rate matches the
longstanding interest among economists in finding out whether an
increase in the police force can economically be justified because it
reduces crime [28–32,48]. This question has led to quite some
controversy among the respective researchers in the field because
most of the earlier studies revealed that policing efforts in a given
year were positively, and not negatively, associated with crime
rates [30,32]. In later studies, it has been recognized that
comparisons between the two variables in a given year across
geographical entities such as cities and states are confounded by
many other factors. Most importantly, data suggested that policing
efforts in such analysis were a product of crime rates and not vice
versa [30,32]. To solve that problem, later studies related changes
in policing efforts across years [30,49,50], electoral cycles [51], and
before/after a terrorist attack [52] to changes in crime rates. These
comparisons generally revealed that increased policing efforts were
indeed associated with lower crime rates. My results are in full
agreement with these findings: (a) within-year comparisons
revealed positive relationships between policing efforts and crime
rates (Table 2, Figure 1C), supporting the previously found
reversion of causality; (b) across-year comparisons revealed a
negative relationship between the two variables (Table 2,
Figure 1D), indicating that increased policing efforts indeed
reduce crime rates. In summary, economical and evolutionary
approaches both indicate that humans seem to respond to changes
in the community policing level by altering their social behaviour.
More specifically, policing seems to deter people from committing
crimes, thereby enforcing cooperation among citizens.
While I focussed on policing as a mechanism to enforce
cooperation, there are a number of other (not necessarily mutually
exclusive) mechanisms that have been suggested to also efficiently
repress competition among interacting individuals [22,53]. Among
these, costly punishment in humans has certainly received most
empirical [12,43,54–59] and theoretical [60–69] attention, with
work specifically aiming at identifying factors that facilitate the
spread of punishment. For example, it has been shown that costly
punishment is more likely favored when it is facultative [61,68],
coordinated at the group level [68], when consequences for
defectors are more severe [70], or when cooperation per se is
facultative [65,66]. Furthermore, costly punishment seems to
evolve more successfully when acting in concert with other factors
known to favor cooperation, such as indirect reciprocity [64] and
reputation building [69]. In addition to punishment, rewarding
has recently been found to also successfully enforce cooperation
among humans [71–74]. Along with the policing studied here,
these data suggest that multiple repression-of-competition mech-
anisms might have jointly played a role in the evolutionary
maintenance of human cooperative behavior.
Important to note is also that in most laboratory studies the
decision whether to punish/reward or not was based on individual
choices. This differs from institutional-based enforcement systems,
such as the policing institutions analyzed in this study. While both
systems seem to be relevant in humans, the question whether
individual-based or institutional-based enforcement systems are
more successful in promoting cooperation is currently a matter of
debate [75,76].
In conclusion, the analyses presented here indicate that
evolutionary policing theory holds for organisms as diverse as
humans and social insects – the two groups of organisms, in which
sophisticated forms of policing have evolved. Despite this support
for evolutionary policing theory, care must be taken not to over
interpret the results from comparative approaches used here and
in other studies. This is because comparative approaches are based
on correlational analysis, which preclude making firm conclusions
on the causalities between correlating variables. Hence, a more
rigorous test of evolutionary policing theory with humans could be
performed in laboratory settings, in which the propensity to
cooperate and police could be measured as a function of an
experimentally manipulated similarity index.
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